The loss of a few neurons in a brain often does not result in a visible loss of function. We propose to advance the understanding of neural networks through their remarkable ability to sustain individual neuron failures, i.e. their fault tolerance. Before the last AI winter, fault tolerance in NNs was a popular topic as NNs were expected to be implemented in neuromorphic hardware, which for a while did not happen. Moreover, since the number of possible crash subsets grows exponentially with the network size, additional assumptions are required to practically study this phenomenon for modern architectures. We prove a series of bounds on error propagation using justified assumptions, show their location on the complexity versus tightness trade-off scale and test them empirically. We demonstrate how fault tolerance is connected to generalization and show that the data jacobian of a network determines its fault tolerance properties. We investigate this quantity and show how it is interlinked with other mathematical properties of the network such as Lipschitzness, singular values, weight matrices norms, and the loss gradients. Known results give a connection between the data jacobian and robustness to adversarial examples, providing another piece of the puzzle. Combining that with our results, we call for a unifying research endeavor encompassing fault tolerance, generalization capacity, and robustness to adversarial inputs together as we demonstrate a strong connection between these areas.
Introduction
Understanding the inner working of neural networks is currently one of the pressing questions [27] in learning theory. Neural networks are the backbone of the most successful machine learning solutions today [44, 25] and are deployed in safety-critical tasks in which there is little room for the robustness issues which are regularly reported since attention was brought to the NNs vulnerabilities over the past few years [45, 7, 34, 11] .
Fault tolerance for neuromorphic hardware. Today, emerging hardware technologies are reviving the neuromorphic dream and its promise to cut off energy consumption of machine learning by several orders of magnitude and increase the speed of computation similarly [12] . This could spark a surge in performance that is similar or exceeding the one that followed the switch from training on CPUs to training on GPUs then on TPUs [1] . Recent results on neuromorphic computing report on experimental successes such as milliwatt image recognition [12] or basic vowel recognition using only four coupled nano-oscillators [41] . This results in a necessity to consider fault tolerance in neural networks as an important overlooked AI safety problem. A failure in such a circuit deployed for a mission-critical application could ultimately result in a wrong decision and a huge loss of money or even potentially life. In terms of fault tolerance, the unit of failure in these architectures is fine-grained * , i.e. it is a single neuron and a single synapse.
Fault tolerance as a piece of the puzzle in theoretical NNs research. Understanding complex systems sometimes comes through the understanding of their ability to tolerate the failure of their components. This has been a particularly fruitful method in systems biology, where the mapping of the full network of metabolite molecules is a computationally quixotic venture. Instead of fully mapping the network, biologists improved their understanding of biological networks by studying the effect of perturbing some of their components, one or a few perturbations at a time [31, 14] . Biological systems in general are found to be fault tolerant [37] which can be a criterion for biological plausibility of mathematical models.
Before the AI winter. In the early days of connectionism, fault tolerance was often listed among the motivations behind neural networks, with arguments such as the graceful . The quest of building energy-efficient hardware that is itself a neural network, freed from the Von Neumann bottleneck, kept a line of research on fault tolerance alive until the late 1990s with VLSI circuits of NNs as a motivation [32, 8, 40] . For instance, in [18] the problem of fault tolerance is addressed using the Lipschitz coefficient and Taylor approximation of the neural network with respect to the input. In [36] , faulty weights are considered and an error approximation is made up to the second order. [39] provides conditions which ensure fault tolerance of neural networks. Most of these are however limited in being pure empirical evaluations, or theoretically grounded, but limited to the simple architechtures of the 1990s, i.e. networks with a single hidden layer.
It is in this context that a key algorithm such as Dropout was invented [24, 23] with the goal of maximizing fault tolerance by training networks while neurons are randomly switched off. Reducing overfitting came out as a bonus in Kerlirzin's work and Dropout would, two decades later, be rebranded as it was crucial in the revival of neural networks [26, 21] from 2012 on.
After the AI winter. There were a few recent attempts to study fault tolerance in (modern and deep) NNs, or to improve the understanding of NNs through the fault tolerance lens. For instance, DeepMind proposed improving the understanding of NNs through neuron removal [35] . Their approach is however limited to empirical evaluation of a single neuron removal. Another approach by NVIDIA was to experimentally evaluate error propagation in NNs, in the context of erroneous bits due to micro-failure in hardware [29] , another similar view is in [3] and other works in the context of high performance computing and lowprecision implementation of deep learning. Another recent approach to fault tolerance through error propagation is presented in [33, 10] , this work also made the connection to adversarial inputs, arguing that they could be viewed as failures in layer zero. The latter provided a series of tight bounds on error propagation, however, the tightness of all the bounds only hold under a strong hypothesis: that networks are not over-provisioned, i.e. that no smaller network can achieve a similar test-error. We argue that the number of unknowns in machine learning (in terms of what function we are trying to learn) are so large that this hypothesis, despite its merits in guaranteeing tightness, is unreasonable in practice and illustrate this in our experiments. Our bounds, in contrast, are based on a Taylor approximation and exploit the sensitivity of the network to inputs. Similar results appeared with different motivations in [13] which † It is ironic that connectionism back then, was called Parallel and Distributed Processing [43] , the name of a field which is all about Fault Tolerance but almost not at all about NNs today. connects the Lipschitz coefficient of the network to adversarial examples and gives a characterization of the error of the network as the gradient over the input. This connection can be traced back to the first observation of so-called evasion attacks [45] . Finally, the question of singular values appears in spectral norms such as [5] which considers the product of largest singular values of weight matrices as a generalization bound, while others use this as a regularization [47] .
The connecting bridge between many of these is the sensitivity or the Lipschitz coefficient of the network. The tight bounds in [33, 10] suggested that one should have a Lipschitz coefficient < 1 to improve robustness, a conclusion that is corroborated by [9] . Disentangling the mathematical nature of neural networks. Our work is rooted in the aforementioned finegrained fault tolerance approach but is not a mere revival of the 1990s wave of interest in fault tolerance of NNs. We argue that several questions, often investigated separately, are the many faces of a the single coin and are tightly connected as visualized in Figure 1 . In fact, our title is itself inspired by LeCun, Denker and Solla's seminal paper 'Optimal Brain Damage' [28] which is yet another (apparently unintentional) illustration of the connection between fault tolerance and generalization that we call for in this work.
Contributions. We provide a series of bounds on error propagation (Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4) in NNs that are stated in terms of expected values and variances and compare them in Table 1 . The mean and the variance of the error are connected to key properties of the network as we demonstrate in this paper (Proposition 8, for example, connects the mean error due to neuron removal to the gradient of the loss). We leverage consequences that were ignored in previous work ‡ and introduce better theoretical assumptions (Definitions 7 ‡ Except [36] where the networks were too simple and contained a single hidden layer of neurons.
and 8) which we show are methodologically and empirically well-grounded. Our contribution is mainly theoretical but we also run proof-of-concept experiments (code is provided) demonstrating that our bounds perform well in practice. In addition, we argue that under the assumptions we made, there is a trivial superposition of errors (Proposition 10) which we test in practice. Moreover, our experiments confirm the connections between the areas as in Figure 1 . In addition, we use the overlooked facts (in old FT literature) that networks are trained by gradient descent, and that there is an underlying data distribution, to produce an explanation on why NNs are fault tolerant and test that prediction empirically (Section 2.5). We theoretically show how dropout in training is connected to fault tolerance (Proposition 9) and that, surprisingly, an expression involving fault tolerance error characterizes both gradient descent and the Dropout procedure (Section 2.5). In addition we show the connection between adversarial examples and fault tolerance in two ways: via the Data Jacobian (Section 2.7) and via bounds connecting adversarial (Byzantine) and crash errors (Propositions 5 and 6). We argue that the Data Jacobian is the quantitative bridge between the many faces of robustness in NNs. Finally, we work on the explicit expression for the Data Jacobian and show that it can be expressed via conventional derivatives w.r.t weights (Proposition 7). The summary of our contribution is represented in Figure 1 .
Outline. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set the formalism, then state our bounds and sketch their proofs. Full proofs are available in the supplementary material. In Section 3, we present our experimental evaluation. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss the consequences of our findings. We then conclude by suggesting research directions and calling for a new research endeavour, connecting fault tolerance to generalization, spectral properties and robustness to adversarial inputs. An endeavour for which this paper could constitute an initial step.
Theoretical Analysis
A precise assessment of NNs fault tolerance should ideally diagnose a network by looking at the outcome of every possible failure, i.e. the Forward Propagated Error [33] resulting from removing every possible subset of neurons. This would lead to an exact assessment, but would be impractical in the face of an exponential explosion of possibilities. This section provides a theoretical alternative, deriving a series of bounds, each requiring only access to the network weights and topology. In Table 1 we situate our bounds in the tradeoff between their precision and ease of computing. Due to space limitation, proof sketches are given, detailed proofs are deferred to the supplementary material. 
We additionally require ϕ to be 1-Lipschitz |ϕ(x)−ϕ(y)| |x−y| § . Note that the last layer is linear. Definition 2. (Neuron failure) A network (L, W, B, ϕ) is said to have failing neurons at the first layer if each column of matrix W 2 is replaced with zeros with probability p independently, or, in other words, the second layer cannot "see" the some components of the output of the first layer.
The resulting output which is now a random variable can be written as:ŷ 1 = y 1 ,ŷ 2 = ϕ(W 2 ξ ŷ 1 + b 2 ) and the definition ofŷ l , i > 1 stays unchanged after replacing y l−1 withŷ l−1 , for being component-wise vector multiplication and {ξ i } being i.i.d. ξ ∼ Be(1 − p). These variables are independent from input or any other variables. Note that definition 3 and Definition 2 are interchangeable. For instance, a failing input is a failure at layer 0. Similarly, a neuron failure at layer l ∈ 1, L − 1 is an input failure on the sub-network (L−l, W L−l , B L−l , ϕ) where X L−l refers the L − l last rows of matrix X. Therefore, from now on, we assume that the input is faulty, not the layer for the sake of simplicity of notation.
Definition 4. (Error in case of failure) The error in case of neuron failure with probability p at the first layer for a network (L, W, B, ϕ) is ∆ i =ŷ i − y i , i ∈ 1, L. From this point on, we write E ξ ∆ L and Var ξ ∆ L meaning the expectation and the variance over neuron crashes.
Definition 5 (Sensitivity, data jacobian or data Lipschitz coefficient). Sensitivity of the network at input x is the quantity ∂y L ∂x (x).
Definition 6 (Byzantine single-coordinate failure). A Byzantine single-coordinate failure is the largest possible error in the output for a bounded input perturbation in single coordinate i of layer input |x i | ≤ δ. We denote it by
Remark. Byzantine failures in input correspond to adversarial examples.
Bound (b1) using norms
Proposition 1 (Norm bound or bound b1). For any norm · the error ∆ L at the last layer on input x and failures in input can be upper-bounded as
which is true for any norm. For subsequent layers we have the old activation of previous layer y l−1 and the spoiled oneŷ l−1 with ∆ l−1 being the difference. Using the Lipschitz property again,
Corollary 1 (Infinity norm, the result of [10]). For an input x with C = x ∞ for failures at the input with O(1) dependent only on layer size, but not on the weights,
The proof is given in the supplementary material.
Bound (b2) using absolute values
Proposition 2 (Absolute value bound). The error on input x can be upper-bounded as: Now we explore additional assumptions which lead to tighter bounds. Namely, we consider small p limit and the infinite width limit.
Definition 7 (Unlikely crash event or single crash limit). A single crash limit case or a "small p case" is a case where the probability of failure
The name derives from the fact that a binomial distribution in the limit of p → 0 (or with np < 1) will be equivalent to a single event.
Motivation. Considering the case of a failure of a single neuron is questionable. The space of all possible failure configurations is huge, and most of them have more than one crash. Moreover, the error itself can be many times larger if many neurons crash. However, such events will be one order of magnitude in terms of p less probable, and therefore could be neglected in the expectation. In case of neuromorphic hardware, the probability of failure is indeed low, and therefore the square of the probability is even lower and can be neglected. This is confirmed in our experiments which use a setting of np ≤ 1 Our approach of using Taylor expansion can be used for higher terms if the task requires it. For example, if it is estimated that p 3 is low enough to be neglected but p 2 is not, then all that is required is to compute one more term.
Proposition 3 (Bound (b4) for small p). Given a neural network y : R n → R 1 with crashes at input with probability p, the expectation and variance of the error ∆ = y(x ξ) − y(x) are:
where x (1 − e i ) is x with i'th component removed.
inition where S k are the subsets of crashed neurons. Now, note that the quantity p
where
1 denotes a set with only i'th neuron crashed. The proof for the variance is analogous. The full proof is available in the supplementary.
Motivation. The purpose of this limit and the corresponding bound is to reduce the computational complexity from O(2 N N L) to O(N 2 L) without significant loss of precision. See Table 1 for details.
Definition 8 (The infinite layer width limit ¶
). The network is said to have infinite width limit at layer i if the number of neurons N i → ∞ such that for each component j,
Motivation. This limit holds up to a certain extent in the experiments, so its introduction is justified.
Proposition 4 (Bound (b3) for infinite width). Given a neural network with a.e. differentiable function ϕ and random variables ξ as in Proposition 3 in the infinite width limit and unlikely crash limit the expectation and variance of ∆ are (with element-wise squares):
similar assumption on infinite width is made in [22]
If ϕ ∈ C 1 (continuously differentiable), the remainder term o(q) is replaced by a better O(q 2 ) and thus the formula can be used as an approximation. We note that for sigmoid ϕ the remainder is O(q 2 ) and for the ReLU it is o(q). Proof sketch. (Full proof in the supplementary.) In the expression of Proposition 3 consider a single y(x−x i e i )−y(x) and rewrite it using a Taylor expansion with Peano remainder up to first degree (the Lagrange form for ϕ ∈ C 1 ).
Motivation. The purpose of this bound is to reduce the computational complexity from O(N 2 L) to O(N L). This can be significant for large networks, see Table 1 .
BYZANTINE FAILURES
In this subsection, we establish a relationship between Byzantine (arbitrary) failures and crashes. We show that their mutual resulting errors on the network are connected through their respective expected value and variance. The proofs of both results are available in the supplementary material.
Proposition 5 (From crashes to Byzantine failures). The error due to Byzantine failures in a C 1 (differentiable) network is upper-bounded by the crash error variance as
Proposition 6 (From Byzantine failures to crashes). In case of C 1 network the variance for fault tolerance is upperbounded via Byzantine error as
The explicit expression for b3 bound for mean Calculating the scalar product (∇y(x), x) explicitly for a neural network with
After writing each matrix multiplication explicitly,
This expression contains three parts: a tensor related to the network weights
Neuromorphic hardware is subject to the laws of classical physics. Thus ϕ ∈ C 1 due to the continuously behaving inductance and capacitance of the circuits. the input example x and the activations of each neuron
The total error is the tensor product between those in the first order limit. Since each index appears 3 times, this expression cannot be stated as matrix product. In other words, the Data Jacobian is determined by individual matrices and not by their product.
Total variance. Using the total variance law
Convolutional network. Since a convolutional network with configuration Conv+MaxPool+ReLU can be seen as a special case of a fully-connected network, the bounds from this paper still apply. We note that using average pooling instead of max pooling and differentiable activation function will lead to better results.
Tail bound. Using results of Proposition 4 it is possible to use tail bounds and bound probabilities P ( ∆ ≥ ε) ≤ δ Proposition 7. For a neural network for any layer l ∈ 0, L the following holds:
Proof sketch. Direct computation of first derivatives, available in the supplementary.
Derivatives w.r.t. weights are more common than ones w.r.t. inputs. Therefore we give the next corollary:
Corollary 2. The error in weights up to O(p 2 + q 2 ) is:
Proof sketch. Almost a direct consequence of Proposition 4 and Proposition 7 and a tensor product. The full proof is in the supplementary.
We note that up to O(p 2 +q 2 ) both the mean and the variance in case of failures in layer l are defined by a tensor
in the infinite width and single crash limits. Proof sketch. Cauchy-Schwartz inequality for the result of Corollary 2. Full proof in the supplementary. This implies that the object with worst error in y i would have W l and ∇ W l y i collinear as vectors.
Gradient descent
In this subsection, we show that leveraging the consequences of gradient descent convergence to a critical point of the loss function yiealds interesting properties in terms of fault tolerance. Proposition 8. For a neural network with C 1 activation function we have for a particular input x ∂L ∂y ,
This means that the fault tolerance is determined in terms of gradient of the loss of the network at a specific object. Corollary 4. Suppose that a C 1 network is trained with gradient descent: E x ∇ W L(x) = 0. Then the network has initial fault tolerance in the sense that
Proof sketch. Take the result of Prop. 8, apply E x on both sides, use E x ∇ W L = 0. Details in the supplementary.
This proposition sheds some light on why neural networks are inherently fault-tolerant in a sense that mean L (y)∆ is 0. This does not imply that the mean of ∆ is zero. * *
We note that in practice after training E x ∇ W y is small but non-zero, therefore we upper-bound the error using results such as Corollary 3. Proposition 9 (Interpretation of Dropout in terms of fault tolerance, similar work can be found in [4]). Training a network with a loss L ∈ C 1 with Dropout p is equivalent up to O(p 2 + q 2 ) to adding a loss regularization term of
We notice that both Corollary 4 (using gradient descent convergence as an assumption) and Proposition 9 (using Dropout at training stage as an assumption) result in a condition on R = E x ∂L ∂y E ξ ∆ and therefore we suggest exploring this quantity as a possible research question.
Error superposition in case of small errors
In this paper we investigate the effect of error propagation in networks, therefore we assume crashes at the first layer or at inputs. One may wonder what happens if there are crashes at multiple layers at the same time. We state that in the limit of p l → 0 we have a linear superposition of errors. * * For example if sign of ∂L/∂y is always same, then GD has not converged because tweaking last bias improves predictions. Norms
Proposition 10. (Linearity of error superposition for small p limit) Consider a network (L, W, B, ϕ) with crashes with probability
Proposition 10 is proven in the supplementary material.
Adversarial examples
A recent result shows that adversarial examples are connected to fault tolerance [15] . It was also known before that adversarial examples can be generated by following ∇ x y(x) [45] . Since in this paper we show that this data jacobian is connected to fault tolerance in Proposition 4, we conclude with more certainty that fault tolerance and adversarial examples resilience are connected areas.
Complexity of the bounds
Input has dimension N , output has dimension M , network has L layers and O(N ) neurons per layer. The complexity of each bound is in Table 1 .
Experimental Evaluation
We test the proposed bounds on two datasets as a proof of concept: the Boston Housing dataset (regression) and the MNIST dataset (classification). We also use randominitialized networks. Code can be found at github.com/LPD-EPFL/FatalBrainDamage Motivation. Our bounds are stated for a general neural network, and therefore they are applicable for larger architectures. One might wonder in which conditions they actually work for larger networks. We note however that this would be out of the scope of one single paper because in the current work we focus on developing the bounds and testing them on proof-of-concept setups. We note that applying our bounds to larger networks and bigger datasets and establishing the region where they are applicable would be an interesting future research direction. † † This is the complexity of one forward pass ‡ ‡ Only under the highly unlikely hypothesis made in [33] of NN being minimally provisioned in neurons 
Testing Proposition 7
The expression is tested experimentally on random networks (see BostonTh7Test.ipynb) and is confirmed.
Error superposition (testing Proposition 10)
We test a random network with L = 4 on random input (see ErrorAdditivityRandom.ipynb). The error is computed on subsets of failing layers a, b. Then all pairs of disjoint subsets are considered, and the relative error of ∆ estimation using linearity is computed as ∆ a∪b − ∆ a − ∆ b / ∆ a∪b . The results (see Figure 2) show that this relative error is only few percent both for mean and variance, with better results for the mean.
Testing Proposition 8
Proposition predicts the expected error E x E ξ ∂L ∂y ∆ to decay with the decay of the gradient of the loss. We tested that experimentally on the Boston dataset using sigmoid networks (see ErrorOnTraining.ipynb) and note that a similar result holds for ReLU § §
. The results are shown in Figure 3 . The chart shows first that the experiment corresponds to b4, and b3 is close to b4. b3 is also equal to the result of Proposition 8, both of which decay, as predicted.
Predicting the error
We compare sigmoid networks with N ∼ 50 trained on Boston Housing dataset ¶ ¶ . We use different inputs on a § § ReLU / ∈ C 1 . However only a small percentage of neurons are near 0 thus approximation works for most of them.
¶ ¶ see ErrorComparisonBoston.ipynb single network and single input on different networks. We compare the bounds using rank loss. The motivation is that even if the bound does not predict the error exactly, it could be still useful if it is able to tell which network is more resilient to crashes. The second quantity is the relative error of ∆ prediction, which is harder to obtain. Experimental error computed on a random subset S of all possible crashed configurations S with |S| = 2 20 ∼ 10 6 is used as ground truth, with |S | big enough to make the expectation and variance results not change from one launch to another. The results are shown in Figure 4 . Even on this simple dataset we have only b3 and b4 giving meaningful results both for rank loss and relative error of error. The results show that b4 is always better than b3, as expected. The same is done for random networks * * *
. We note that in these experiments bounds b4 and b3 work, therefore the small p limit np = 10 −3 · 50 < 1 holds as does the infinite width limit.
INCREASING TRAINING DROPOUT
We trained † † † sigmoid networks with N ∼ 100 on MNIST with probabilities of failure at inference and training stages p i = 0.05 and 10 values of p t ∈ [0, 1.2p i ]. We use unscaled version of dropout ‡ ‡ ‡ . The experiment is repeated 10 times. When estimating the error experimentally, we chose 6 repetitions of the training dataset to ensure that the variance of the estimate is low. The results are shown in Figure 5 . The results show that, first, dropout increases the resilience of the network to crashes and slightly increases the correct network error, as it was known before. Moreover, crashing MAE is most dramatically affected by dropout. Second most affected is the accuracy. Moreover, b3/b4 can correctly order which network is trained with bigger dropout parameter with only 4% rank loss. p < 0.03 is used as a threshold after which no visible change is happening. All other quantities, including norms of the weights and bounds, were not able to order networks correctly.
Making networks more resilient by regularization with a bound
In the previous section, bound b3 is demonstrated to be able to tell correctly which network is more resilient. We therefore use it as a regularization technique as a replacement for dropout, see Regularization.ipynb. The experiments were done with settings similar to the previous section. It is established that the resilience of the network regularized with Dropout is similar to that of a network regularized with b3 bound, see Figure 6 . Variance bound is used for regularization instead of the exact expression which would replace dropout provided by Proposition 9. Even if Var∆ is not exact expression, the resulting fault tolerance is competitive still. Both dropout and our bound use similar probabilistic model which could explain this result.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that fault tolerance is an important overlooked concrete AI safety issue [2] . Moreover, we have provided tractable ways of evaluating fault tolerance on modern architectures (Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4) and tested our assumptions (Section 3). We demonstrate mathematically how fault tolerance is interlinked with the loss gradient (Proposition 8 and Corollary 4), with the data jacobian (Proposition 4) and with network weights (Corollary 2). We show theoretically a connection between adversarial examples and fault tolerance (Propositions 5, 6 and Section 2.7).
In addition we provided a mathematical explanation of the remarkable fault tolerance of NNs (Proposition 4) and connected Dropout to Fault tolerance (Proposition 9 and Section 3.5). The summary of our contribution is demonstrated in the Figure 1 .
A unified research endeavor. We show how the key concepts related to neural networks such as dropout, training stage, fault tolerance, adversarial examples, generalization and singular values of the network are connected around a mathematical component which ties them together: the Data Jacobian. We argue that investigating into that quantity specifically could yield more fruitful results in all of these areas.
Future research directions.
One possible extension would be to consider the worst case instead of the average case scenario, similarly to what has been done in [33] but without the restricting minimality hypothesis. Another interesting direction is somehow similar the Generative Adversarial Networks [16] setting: a min-max game between two networks where one network crashes the most important neurons of the other while the latter learns to recover. Also we note that our bounds b3 and b4 consider only the case of one failing neuron, or in terms of Taylor expansion, are accurate up to O(p 2 ). This means that a network is resilient to any single crashing neuron or any single coordinate attack. However, our bounds do not hold for more crashing neurons or more than one coordinate available to the adversary. A natural extension of our work would be to consider higher orders, such as 2 or 3 crashing neurons. Another possible extension would be to consider weight or input distribution or to consider an infinite depth limit. Moreover, utilizing the second-order condition
0 to get a constraint on the variance Var∆ could potentially yield a result on fault tolerance shedding more light on why are neural networks inherently fault-tolerant. In addition, it could be fruitful to examine the explicit expression for the gradient ∇ x y(x) and characterize its action on an input x in terms of singular values of weight matrices W and removed from them rows corresponding to inactive neurons K. One more extension would be to try connecting Dropout to adversarial examples (the paper [38] considers a special case but not the original version). Another extension is to continue the connection between fault tolerance and Dropout started in Proposition 9. One more direction would be to try larger networks and bigger datasets. [4] P. Baldi and P. J. Sadowski. Understanding dropout.
In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages 2814-2822, 2013.
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Note that the last layer is linear.
We assume the function ϕ being 1-Lipschitz: Definition 7 (Unlikely crash event or single crash limit). A single crash limit case or a "small p case" is a case where the probability of failure p = p failure → 0
Definition 8 (The infinite layer width limit). The network is said to have infinite width limit at layer i if the number of neurons N i → ∞ such that for each component j,
2 Propositions in the main paper Proposition 1 (Norm bound or bound b1). For any norm · the error ∆ L at the last layer on input x and failures in input can be upper-bounded as
Proof. We assume a faulty input as in Definition 3. By Definition 4, the error at the last layer is
, we use the 1-Lipschitzness of ϕ. In particular, we use that for two vectors x and y and ϕ(x), ϕ(y) applied element-wise, we have ϕ(x)−ϕ(y) ≤ x−y because the absolute difference in each component is less on the left-hand side. We thus get
Now, since the inner layer act in a similar manner, we inductively apply the same argument for underlying layers and get
Moreover, by the definition 3 of our model we have failing input, thusx = ξ x which completes the proof.
Corollary 1 (Infinity norm).
For an input x with C = x ∞ for failures at the input with O(1) dependent only on layer size, but not on the weights,
Proof. First we examine the expression (4) from the other paper [1] and show that it is equivalent to the result we are proving now:
here we have C l the maximal value at layer l, L the Lipschitz constant, w m is the maximal over output neurons (rows of W ) and mean absolute value over input neurons (columns of W ) weight, f l is the number of crashed neurons. Now we set f 1 = pN 1 and f i = 0 for i > 1 and moreover we assume K = 1 as in the main paper. Therefore the bound is rewritten as:
Now we notice that the quantity N l w l m = W l ∞ and therefore
Now we assume that the network has one more layer so that the bound from [1] works for a faulty input in the original network:
Here C = max{|x i |} = x ∞ . Next we prove that result independently using Proposition 1 for
) from the proof of Proposition 3:
and therefore in the first order:
Next we plug that back into the expression for E ∆ ∞ :
Now we note that this expression and the expression from [1] differ only in a numerical constant in front of the bound: N0 N L instead of N 0 , but the bounds behave in the same way with respect to weights. This proof shows how bounds proved in the main paper relate to bounds in [1] .
Proposition 2 (Absolute value bound). The error on input x can be upper-bounded as:
Proof. This expression involves absolute value of the matrices multiplied together as matrices and then multiplied by absolute value of the column vector.
We assume a faulty input as in Definition 3. By Definition 4, the error at the last layer is
Thus for the i'th component of the error,
By the triangle inequality,
Next we go one level deeper according to Definition 1:
| And then apply the 1-Lipschitzness property of ϕ:
This brings us to the previous case and thus we analogously have
Inductively repeating these steps, we obtain:
Now we take the expectation and move it inside the matrix product by linearity of expectation:
The last expression involves E|x − x|. This is component-wise expectation of a vector and we examine a single component. Since ξ i is a Bernoulli random variable,
Plugging it into the last expression for E|∆ L | proves the proposition.
Proposition 3. Given a neural network y : R n → R 1 with crashes at input with probability p, the expectation and variance of the error ∆ = y(x ξ) − y(x) are:
where x (1 − e i ) is the vector x with i'th component removed.
Proof. Assume a faulty n-dimensional input x with probability p. By definition of the expectation,
Here s ∈ S is a subset of crashing neurons. By |s| we denote the number of crashed neurons in the subset and by x s we denote the input x with components in s replaced by 0.
Now we group the subsets into disjoint sets S = S 0 S 1 . . . S n by the number of neurons crashed in that subset:
Now we examine the expression f (n, k, p) = p k (1 − p) n−k and the term (1 − p) n−k specifically using the formula
Multiplying it back with p k we get for a constant n:
Now we go back to the expression for E∆. In case k = 0 there are no crashes and therefore x s 0 ≡ x thus y(x s 0 ) ≡ y(x), therefore this term is zero. For k = 1 and larger we obtain
We note that the first summand is then p
with i'th component removed, as in the statement of the proposition The second term is for constant n,
This completes proof for E∆. Now we consider Var∆ = E∆ 2 − (E∆) 2 . Since we have computed E∆ previously we know that E∆ = O(p) and thus (E∆) 2 = O(p 2 ). In other words, this term can be neglected so we focus on the term Var∆ = E∆ 2 + O(p 2 ). For E∆ 2 the proof is the same as for E∆ with the only difference that we have (y(x s) − y(x)) 2 instead of y(x s) − y(x).
Proposition 4 (Bound for infinite width or bound b3). Given a neural network with a.e. differentiable function ϕ and random variables ξ as in Proposition 3 in the infinite width limit the expectation and variance of ∆ are (with element-wise squares):
In case if ϕ ∈ C 1 , the remainder term o(q) is replaced by a better O(q 2 ) and thus the formula can be used as an approximation. We note that for sigmoid ϕ the remainder is O(q 2 ) and for the ReLU it is o(q).
Proof. We apply Proposition 3 and get
Let us consider a single summand y(x (1 − e i )) − y(x). In case the function ϕ ∈ C 1 , the function y is also y ∈ C 1 as a composition of functions. Then we use the Taylor formula with Lagrange remainder at point x for the function y:
Since by the Definition 8 we have |x i | q x , we have |x (1 − e i ) − x| ≤ q x = O(q) for constant x (we assume that even if the number of neurons in the layer tends to infinity, the total norm of the input is bounded) Thus,
Now, the vector x (1 − e i ) − x is 0 everywhere except for the i'th component for which it is equal to −x i . Therefore,
Plugging that into the equations obtained from Proposition 3 gives the result.
Remark. The previous proof for Proposition 3 used p → 0 implying np < 1, and this proof uses n → ∞. The condition np < 1 can be true even now by assuming p → 0 faster than n → ∞. In practice, we only use the resulting formula as an approximation with some fixed n and p.
Proposition 5 (From faults to Byzantine failures). Byzantine error is upper-bounded by fault tolerance variance as (for ϕ ∈ C 1 ):
Proof. Take the definition 6 of a Byzantine fault and use the Taylor formula for it:
and work on the upper bound for the gradient component using bound b3 (Proposition 4):
Plugging that into the expression for ∆ B i we had earlier gives the result of the proposition.
Proposition 6 (From Byzantine failures to faults). Variance for fault tolerance is upper-bounded via Byzantine error as (for ϕ ∈ C 1 ):
Now, in the limit of δ → 0 only the linear term will matter, and the optimal difference |x i −x i | will this be arbitrarily close to δ. We consider the limit case: |x i −x i | = δ and thus
Thus we obtain
After squaring it becomes:
We plug that upper bound inside the variance equation from Proposition 4:
Proposition 7. For neural network we have for any weight matrix W l and input to the l'th layer y l−1 :
The equality also holds for one particular y Proof. Fix some layer l. The output of the network y depends on the weight matrix W l and on the input to the l'th layer y l−1 . However we note that it only depends on their product and not on these quantities separately. Therefore we write y = y L (W l , y l−1 , ...) = η(W l y l−1 ) and denote x = y l−1 , W = W l and z = W x:
Now we take one
Therefore we plug that in:
And multiply with x j :
Now we compute ∂y ∂Wij using that in vector z only z i depends on W ij and also that z = W x:
Then we multiply it by W ij and sum over i:
And now we note that the expressions for 
Corollary 2. The error expressed in weights is
Where ∆ l L is the error in case of neurons failing at layer l. Layer 0 means failing input.
In other words up to O(p 2 + q 2 ) both mean and variance in case of failures in error l are defined by a tensor
Proof. According to Proposition 4 the expression for mean and variance are:
Then by Proposition 7 the expression used can be rewritten as (note index swap i ↔ j):
Then for the mean it is:
and the indices can be swapped again for the sake of notation. For variance we write the square as the inner sum repeated twice with different indices k and j:
This gives the first statements. Then we notice that both expressions depend on the values of tensor 
For variance we have up to O(p 2 + q 2 ):
in the infinite width and single crash limits.
Proof. Cauchy-Schwartz inequality for the result of Corollary 2 applied for matrices flattened to vectors:
Proposition 8. For a neural network with C 1 activation function we have for a particular input x ∂L ∂y ,
Proof. Take the expression A = We plug that back in:
This is the exact statement from the proposition.
Corollary 4. Suppose that a C 1 network is trained with gradient descent:
Then the network has initial fault tolerance in the sense that
Proof. Consider the quantity in question, use Proposition 8 for it and apply E x on both sides:
Now since we know that E x ∂L ∂W = 0, the linear term is 0 Proposition 9 (Interpretation of Dropout). Training a network with loss L ∈ C 1 with Dropout p is equivalent up to O(p 2 + q 2 ) to adding a loss regularization term of
Proof. Consider the difference in the loss for a single input and use Taylor formula with Lagrange remainder:
Now since we know that ∆ L = O(p) by Proposition 4, we conclude by noticing that O( ∆ 2 ) = O(p 2 + q 2 ). Remark. By writing that a random variable ∆ L = O(p) we mean its expectation. A more formal proof of this result would be similar to proofs Propositions 3 and 4: a loss applied to the output of the network can be seen as just another layer.
Proposition 10. (Linearity of error superposition for small p limit) Consider a network (L, W, B, ϕ) with crashes at each layer with probability p l , l ∈ 0, L. Then the total mean or variance of the error at the last layer is equal to a vector sum of errors in case crashes were at a single layer for p = max{p 0 , . . . , p L }: Proof. Consider each layer i having a probability of failure
In this proof we utilize both infinite width limit (Definition 8) and unlikely crash event limit (Definition 7). First we write the definition of the expectation for
As in the proof of Proposition 3 we utilize the fact that the quantity f (p, n, k) = p k + O(p k+1 ) and thus only the configurations (s 0 , ...., s L ) matter in the first order which have one crash in total (in all layers) which we denote as s 1 k ∈ S k . Therefore we write
This is equivalent to a sum of individual layer crashes up to O(p 2 ), see the proof of Proposition 3:
The proof for variance is analogous as it is in the Proposition 3 proof.
3 Additional experiments
Comparison on random networks
The same setup is done for random networks with N ∼ 20, ReLU activation function, see ErrorComparisonRandom.ipynb.
The results are shown in Figure 1 and they are qualitatively the same as for Boston dataset. This proposition means that the expected absolute error in case of neuron crashes is bounded in terms of the mean absolute value of the gradient over objects. In other words, for an individual object, ∆ 1 (x) = (|∂L(y(x))/∂W | , |W |) |∂L(y(x))/∂y|
The idea was to show that the bigger the gradient on the input, the bigger the fault tolerance error is. However this claim cannot be made because a large ∂L ∂W can imply large ∂L ∂y which would cancel out in the expression for ∆ 1 above. This is why this proposition did not make it to the main paper.
We note that it could be fruitful trying to understand the connection between loss gradient and fault tolerance error more.
Proposition 12 (Variance for bound b1, not useful since the bound does not work in the experiments, it is not tight. Done in a similar manner as the mean bound in [1] ). The variance of the error Var∆ is upper-bounded as
is the corrupted output from layer L and K is the activation function Lipschitz constant. Thus, 
7. P L = E(y −ŷξ) 2 = Ey
9. Consider a recurrence x 1 = a 1 , x n = a n + b n x n−1 . Then
, where
Therefore,
The goal of this proposition was to give an expression for variance in a similar manner as it is done for the mean in [1] . However this proposition did not make it to the article because bound b1 was not showing any good experimental results.
Failed experiments

Quadratic dependence after GD convergence
The Corollary 4 predicts that the function E x E ξ ∂L ∂y ∆(p) should be quadratic as the first-order term is zero. However in practice we note that this does not hold since the training loss E x ∇ W L is not exactly 0, see BostonTh2QuadraticTest.ipynb.
